By Matthew Russell Lee
UNITED NATIONS, April 10 -- After Kofi Annan's letter was distributed to Security Council members by the US, this month's Council president, Annan's deputy Jean-Marie Guehenno was asked questions and so-called "elements to the press" were agreed to, and enunciated later by US Ambassador Susan Rice.
Inner City Press asked Rice about two points in Annan's letter, which Inner City Press obtained and put online at 12:28 pm while the meeting was still underway. Annan recounts that Assad on April 8 set pre-conditions including that regional countries not fund the opposition. Was there any discussion?
Rice replied that "there was general discussion of the additional conditions, and the letter of the envoy as well as the discussion in the Council made clear that nobody is prepared to contemplate or give validity to any additional conditions. There was no specific discussion of the details of those conditions."
Inner City Press what "substantial differences emerged" between General Mood of Annan's team and the Assad government. Rice replied that "there was a bit of discussion about it in the Q and A, and Jean-Marie Guehenno indicated that, at a certain stage, the Government and its engagements with the Mood team were essentially reflecting some of the conditions that they had said publicly, which were not consistent with the envoy's plan and the Six Point Plan endorsed by the Security Council; therefore, it became difficult to continue to productively proceed along those lines. I think we'll get a fuller understanding of those challenges and what next steps, if any, are contemplated with the technical team on the 12th when Kofi Annan will have had an opportunity to debrief with his team leadership."
Annan's letter asked the Security Council to register it deep concern. It is debatable if an "elements to the press," the weakest form of Council action if in fact it can even be considered an action given that it is not even put on the Council's web site, really registers or expresses such deep concern. It was a fast response, however.
A well placed regional source told Inner City Press on April 9, "Kofi has mediator's disease -- he'll never want to admit that he's failed, that he's been played. But when will he lose all credibility?"
Another source on April 9 told Inner City Press the buzz is that the Kofi Annan Foundation has been raising money "for Syria work." Inner City Press submitted this as a question to Annan's spokesman Ahmad Fawzi, who replied that he will look into it and response on Friday -- that is, the day AFTER Annan's briefing of the Council.
While Assad has asked Annan to stop countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar from funding the opposition, some wonder if there is other funding in play. Where, Inner City Press has asked Annan's spokesman, is his Arab League nominated deputy Nassar El-Kidwa? The spokesman, admittedly busy and traveling to Iran, replied that he doesn't know. Watch this site.
From the US Mission transcript:
Inner City Press: The letter seems to say that on April 8th the Asad government asked Kofi Annan to get commitments from regional countries to stop the funding of the opposition, but it doesn't really say what was done on that. What was the position? Was there any discussion in the Council of this idea of regional countries openly saying they would fund the Free Syrian Army? And also, there's this mention of the General Mood-substantial differences emerged during his time there. Was there any Q and A with Mr. Guehenno? What can we say about these differences, and what do they foretell for an observer mission?Ambassador Rice: Well, with respect to the additional conditions that the government announced on the 8th, there was general discussion of the additional conditions, and the letter of the envoy as well as the discussion in the Council made clear that nobody is prepared to contemplate or give validity to any additional conditions. There was no specific discussion of the details of those conditions. With respect to the technical assessment mission, the technical assessment mission-or technical mission-of General Mood, there was a bit of discussion about it in the Q and A, and Jean-Marie Guehenno indicated that, at a certain stage, the Government and its engagements with the Mood team were essentially reflecting some of the conditions that they had said publicly, which were not consistent with the envoy's plan and the Six Point Plan endorsed by the Security Council; therefore, it became difficult to continue to productively proceed along those lines. I think we'll get a fuller understanding of those challenges and what next steps, if any, are contemplated with the technical team on the 12th when Kofi Annan will have had an opportunity to debrief with his team leadership.
