On Sudans, China Got Change to Sanctions Only "If Necessary," Russia to Vote Yes

By Matthew Russell Lee

UNITED NATIONS, May 2 -- After the US put its Sudans draft resolution "into blue" on April 30, even on May 1 there were further consultations and changes. 

  On May 2 in front of the Security Council, Chinese Permanent Representative Li Baodong told the Press that a change had been made -- Article 41 sanctions only "if necessary." With that, he said, China would vote yes.

  Inner City Press asked US Ambassador Susan Rice if the draft resolution in blue had been modified. She nodded and answered, "Very little, it's a good text." 

 

  Unanimous adoption has been brought about. Russia's Ambassador Vitaly Churkin told the press that he would be voting yes, "because of the African Union" and its request. He said Russia would make a statement expressing reservations.

  South Sudan representative Agnes Oswaha told Inner City Press that Article 41 is still in "but not explicitly." She entered the Security Council with her ministerial delegation including Deng Alor, who has said that the negotiations with Khartoum have to go beyond the Thabo Mbeki process and have more teeth.

Sudan's Permanent Representative walked into the Council in a bright white suit. One expects another round of dueling stakeouts after the vote. What about the damage at Heglig?

  Separately -- or not -- the buzz in front of the Security Council Wednesday morning was that the proposed lists of 40 new entities to be put on the North Korea sanctions list, whittled by China down to two, was now up to three, with a silence procedure running until noon on Wednesday. Questions were posed to entering Ambassadors but those asked, did not answer.

Footnote: Azerbaijan, May's President of the Security Council, had a press conference on May's program of work scheduled for 12:30, the normal time. But then it was listed as "canceled." One wonders if that means postponed until the Sudan resolution dust settles. Every other recent president has done such a presser. Watch this site.

After S. Sudan Letter, UN Stalled on Chapter 7, Heglig & Sanctions, No SOFA

By Matthew Russell Lee

UNITED NATIONS, April 27 -- When the UN Security Council ended another Sudan session after 6 pm on Friday, at least three issues remained without agreement.

  These included how to refer to the damage to the oil facilities at Heglig, whether to have the resolution be under UN Charter Chapter 7 as the African Union had requested, and whether to delete or modify the reference to Article 41 in Operative Paragraph 9, as requested in a letter Sudan delivered to Council members Friday morning.

  Asked why there was resistance to using Chapter 7 as the AU communique requested, one Council member told Inner City Press, "this resolution is essentially about Chapter 6 mediation, and Chapter 8 regional organizations. Why put it under Chapter 7? So you can later invade?" 

  The last phrase seemed hyperbole. Some note that Sudan's letter did not object to Chapter 7, only to Article 41.

Inner City Press obtained Sudan's letter and put it online, here.

South Sudan also submitted a letter, and got it distributed by the US President of the Council, unlike Sudan, some noted. Inner City Press has just obtained the South Sudan letter and puts it online here.

  South Sudan's letter, from Representative Agnes Oswaha, among other things makes clear that the UN has STILL not signed a Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA for its Abyei mission, even after the lack of a SOFA played a role in the inability to med-evac out four Ethiopian peacekeepers hit and killed by landmines.
  
    DPKO's Herve Ladsous has repeatedly said the needed SOFA was immanent but, as with so much, it still has not happened.

From South Sudan's letter:

There are only a few areas where South Sudan believes the Resolution could be strengthened and made more precise.

We welcome Preambular Paragraph 11. It could be strengthened by adding reference to a "political and negotiated solution including all relevant Sudanese parties..." As has been recognized by many countries, while South Sudan can play a role in facilitating a negotiated peace in the Two Areas, it is still very important that Sudan sit with Sudanese parties to discuss their legitimate grievances, which predate even the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

2) We believe Operative Paragraph 1 (iv) could more precisely read "cease ANY [not "the'] harboring of, or support to, rebel groups against the Other State."

3) It would be more precise as well as helpful in advancing implementation of prior agreements if Operative Paragraphs l(vi) and 2(ii) of the resolution refer to the ful! name of the initialed nationality agreement -- the "Framework Agreement on the Status of Nationals of the Other State and Related Matters." This also would provide the opening to refer to -- and call for the implementation of-- the recently initialed border agreement in Operative Paraÿaph 2(iii). We respectfully propose that Operative Paragraph 2(iii) now read "resolution of the stares of the disputed and claimed border areas and the demarcation of the border, "including the demarcation of the already defined border areas, consistent with the Agreement between the Republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan on the Demarcation of the Boundary initialed in March 2012..."

4) South Sudan further welcomes Operative Paragraph 2 which calls for the resumption of "negotiations, under the auspices of the AUHIP and with the support of the Chairman of IGAD." (emphasis added). This is consistent with the call South Sudan has issued previously to immediately resume negotiations, reflect more on the current facilitation mechanism, and increase the high level international support given to the same. South Sudan welcomes the support and presence of IGAD in tile negotiations and would be pleased to see other provisions increasing the transparency of the negotiations and access to the negotiations for other States and institutions. That said, in light of this additional support to be provided by IGAD -- as was also called for by the AU in Paragraph 13 of the PSC's Communique -- and the role that the PSC has given to the Chair of the AU Commission with respect to these matters (including a monthly reporting role, as mentioned in paragraphs 18-20 of the Communique), South Sudan believes that the second part of Operative Paragraph 5 could read as follows: "requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the AUHIP, the Chair of IGAD and the Chairman of the AU Commission, to report within four months of the date of this resolution to the Security Council on the status of the negotiations, including detailed proposals on al! outstanding issues;". In this way the Security Council will be assured a report that draws upon many observations and perspectives.

5) Regarding Operative Paragraph 6, while South Sudan is most appreciative of the efforts of the AUHIP and has called for an immediate return to the negotiations, the terms of reference for the AUHIP technically provide that it is a facilitator and not a mediator mad as such, for accuracy, the wording should be "facilitation efforts" and not "mediation efforts".

6) With respect to Operative Paragraph 8, South Sudan would like to see the following addition: "expresses its intention to evaluate the mandate of UNISFA in the context of compliance by Sudan and South Sudan with the decisions set forth in tiffs resolution, and with the fulfillment of their commitments as set out in the June 20, June 29, and July 30, 2011 Agreements, as well as the adequacy of the number of its forces to carry out its mandated functions." South Sudan believes that this would expressly give the UN, in consultation with the relevant parties, an opportunity to clearly assess if the number of troops that were mandated to monitor the entire international border (a small number when compared with those present in Abyei) will be enough in light of the current circumstances, even with the good faith inplementation of this resolution and the prior security agreements reached between the parties. This is not to suggest that a new force be created, but only to suggest that the Council must examine in depth the question as to whether the existing UNISFA force has the resources to carry out its mandated duties.

7) In this context, we also respectfully suggest that the Security Council consider adding a paragraph with respect to the requirement of the two Governments to finally approve the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for the UNISFA forces, South Sudan has long been ready to sign such an agreement but there has been an unnecessary delay. Concluding the SOFA will facilitate the important work of UNISFA.

  But again, the UN has STILL not signed a Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA for its Abyei mission, even after the lack of a SOFA played a role in the inability to med-evac out four Ethiopian peacekeepers hit and killed by landmines. 

  DPKO's Herve "The Drone" Ladsous has repeatedly said the needed SOFA was immanent but, as with so much, it still has not happened. Watch this site.

On Sudan, Tour of Heglig & Talk of $1B Harm, US Draft Is Out, Darfur Phantoms

By Matthew Russell Lee

UNITED NATIONS, April 26, updated -- While the UN Security Council met on Darfur Thursday morning, sources told Inner City Press that the US would use the meeting to circulate a draft resolution supporting the African Union communique on Sudan and South Sudan.

  When the closed door consultations ended, three Council members told Inner City Press they had just gotten the draft -- "and the US wants action right away," one of them complained. Inner City Press reported this, and a half an hour later US Ambassador Susan Rice confirmed the draft was out.

  But another issue lurked: the serious damage to the oil facilities at Heglig. Several Council members said their Ambassadors in Khartoum had been taken the day before down to Heglig and were "shocked" by the level of destruction. One member spoke of pictures, of a $1 billion repair cost and work to take up to a year.

  Another, a Sudan supporter, even described what he called South Sudan's sabotage of Heglig as a "war crime," saying "you can kill people directly or by denying a country half its income." The goal in this scenario, however, seems to be regime change and not starvation. Regime change through starvation?

  Inner City Press asked Ambassador Susan Rice about Heglig and its relation to the resolution and situation between the two Sudans. She said again that it is not clear who caused the damage: "there are multiple ways that this could have been caused by the fighting between the parties, by sabotage, by either or both sides, or indeed by aerial bombardment, which was utilized by Khartoum in trying to dislodge the SPLA forces from Heglig."

    Rice confirmed the trip of Ambassadors down to Heglig. She said the "draft is really primarily focused on reinforcing the African Union decision of a couple of days ago."

  When Sudan's Permanent Representative Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali Osman came after Rice to the stakeout, Inner City Press asked him if his government supports the communique. We are a member of the African Union, he said, but that does not mean that the AU should be "used" by UN Security Council members. Later he said that the communique's timelines -- he mentioned "one week" -- were too tight.

  One still wanted the view of South Sudan's Representative Agnes Oswaha; even in her absence of Heglig it can be said that the oil from South Sudan's Unity State transited through there, meaning Juba loses too, even if the oil transfer fee were settled.

  Much less focus was given to the morning's ostensibly subject, Darfur. UN Peacekeeping under Herve Ladsous is proposing to reduce and redeploy the UNAMID mission's posts. In the Council's open meeting he painted an improving, some say Pollyanna picture of Darfur including North Darfur.

When the meeting ended, South Africa's Permanent Representative Baso Sangqu expressed concern that pulling out too late could lead to a "backlash" and the need to return. It recalled Timor Leste, where the UN pulled out then rushed back in after violence.

  Inner City Press asked US Ambassador Rice about this critique. She said the US "hardly sanguine about the security situation. We see that the violence is escalating in four or five regions of Darfur, and we're particularly concerned about North Darfur and Jebel Marra... The way we understand the proposals by DPKO is not to really think of it as a downsizing but, rather, a right-sizing so that the personnel that they have are ones that are, first of all, optimally equipped and trained. There's been some issues with that, I think you know."

UK Permanent Representative Mark Lyall Grant told Inner City Press that many of the posts proposed for elimination were not presently filled -- "phantom posts" -- and that some of the peacekeepers to be rotated out hadn't necessarily done a perfect job.

   Rice on camera more charitably said "as you know," some have not had the right equipment and training. It brought to mind a scandal in which a Nepalese battalion deployed with armored personnel carriers that did not work. This in term brought to mind Haiti and MINUSTAH -- but that's another story. Watch this site.

From the US Mission to the UN transcript:

Inner City Press: On Darfur, Ambassador Sangqu of South Africa just said he's at least concerned of this idea of reducing the force size, such that there could be kind of a backlash. I think it happened in East Timor, for example. At one time, the UN pulled out. Does the U.S. think that things are going as well in Darfur as it seemed that Mr. Ladsous was saying, that-at least in the north and on the borders? And on Sudan / South Sudan: I've heard that the U.S. ambassador and other ambassadors are going to actually visit Heglig and see the damage. I want to know if that's true and how that relates to the issues in your draft resolution and in trying to get the two parties negotiating. Do you think that this-I've heard that it's as much as a billion dollars of damage or long-term repair. What's the relation between that fact on the ground and what you want to see the two parties do?

Ambassador Rice: Well, on Heglig, I think it is the case that the government in Khartoum was trying to organize to take some diplomats down to Heglig. I don't-I think what is clear is that there has been damage. I don't know that we have reliable cost estimates on that. What is most unclear is how the damage was caused, and I discussed this the other day. There are multiple ways that this could have been caused by the fighting between the parties, by sabotage, by either or both sides, or indeed by aerial bombardment, which was utilized by Khartoum in trying to dislodge the SPLA forces from Heglig-or maybe come combination thereof. It doesn't factor directly into the draft we're discussing because the draft is really primarily focused on reinforcing the African Union decision of a couple of days ago.

Going back to Darfur, remind me again of what-

Inner City Press: There's a concern expressed by South Africa and maybe others that, if you pull out too quickly, you might have to go back in as took place in Timor Leste.

Ambassador Rice: Well, first of all, from a U.S. point of view, we're hardly sanguine about the security situation. We see that the violence is escalating in four or five regions of Darfur, and we're particularly concerned about North Darfur and Jebel Marra. So this remains a very insecure, very serious situation. The way we understand the proposals by DPKO is not to really think of it as a downsizing but, rather, a right-sizing so that the personnel that they have are ones that are, first of all, optimally equipped and trained. There's been some issues with that, I think you know. Secondly, that the police component is configured to be maximally effective and to be deployed in areas where they can have the greatest beneficial impact in terms of protecting civilians. There have been issues with air assets having been grounded by the government-underutilized-so I think they're trying to address those as well. So, obviously the Council will have further opportunity to delve into these recommendations, as I said, when we do the mandate renewal. But certainly from our point of view, I don't think it's correct to view it as a downsizing but, rather, trying to align the personnel resources and equipment on the ground with the needs as they are today, as opposed to when the force was originally mandated.