If ECOWAS Sends 1000 Ivorian Troops to Mali, Screening for Duekoue?

By Matthew Russell Lee

UNITED NATIONS, April 28 -- As ECOWAS moves to send 3000 soldiers to Mali, it's reported that up to 1000 of them will be from Cote d'Ivoire, whose Alassane Ouattara is heading up ECOWAS. 

 

  Less than a year ago, Ouattara's fighters supported by the French Force Licorne and the UN captured and then sent former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

  But during that fight and subsequent process, there was talk of an investigation of and accountability for massacres including that at Duekoue, which is attributed to pro-Ouattara (and pro Guillaume Soro) fighters. 

 

  So what safeguards are in place that individuals and commanders involved and implicated in Duekoue are not sent as supposed peacekeepers to Mali?

  Already at the UN, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has accepted without protest as one of his Senior Advisers on Peacekeeping a Sri Lankan commander, Shavendra Silva, whose 58th Division is depicted in Ban's own report as engaged in war crimes -- recently upgraded to include the use of cluster bombs, which Inner City Press asked the UN about on April 27, so far without response.

  Nor has the UN responded to a request earlier in the week by Inner City Press that it describe what screening is done of peacekeepers before they are deployed across borders, compared even to UN Volunteers and particularly in light of the UN's essentially proved introduction of cholera to Haiti?

We will have more on all these questions -- and the planned deployment and threatened sanctions on Guinea Bissau -- in the coming days. Watch this site.

In Darfur, UN Silent on Detention, Accepts Expulsion, Ladsous Offers Praise

By Matthew Russell Lee

UNITED NATIONS, April 27 -- The UN in Darfur has allowed a staff member to allowed a staff member to languish in detention since February 24, while another staff member was excluded or declared "persona non grata" by the Government, not even allowed back in to pick up her belongings.

  Meanwhile Herve Ladsous, the fourth Frenchman in a row atop UN Peacekeeping, has said things are going well in Darfur and that the peacekeeping force should be reduced. Going well for whom?

  On April 26 Inner City Press asked Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's deputy Spokesman Eduardo Del Buey about both cases:

Inner City Press: in the Security Council this morning, Mr. Ladsous mentioned, without naming, a UNAMID staffer who he said has been arrested and detained by the Sudanese authorities since 24 February. I’d like to know what UNAMID is doing to get the person out...

Deputy Spokesperson: As I said, Matthew, we don’t discuss whatever conversations take place with respect to detained people. That is something that we maintain confidential so that we can ensure, as far as possible, the safety and well-being of the people that are detained.

Inner City Press: How about the people that are PNG’d, persona-non-grataed? there is a woman, Hawa Haydar, who is a staff member of UNAMID, who the Government unilaterally said they don’t want her to come back, I’ve seen the correspondence, she can’t even get back in to get her personal belongings. Since it is not a matter of safety, it is just a matter of a Government--

Deputy Spokesperson: Well, I’ll have to check on that, Matthew, I don’t have information on that particular case.

  Often such responses are never followed up upon. But on April 27 Del Buey read out an answer, and took another question about the UNAMID mission in Darfur:

Deputy Spokesman: On detained staff mentioned by USG Ladsous, we have nothing further to add on these matters than what has already been shared with you. The United Nations is making every effort within its capacity to secure the safe release of the staff members. With respect to the PNG-ed UNAMID staff member, Howa Halyer, as previously stated, an explanation from the Government of Sudan for its decision to declare the staff member persona non-grata has been sought via Note Verbale and we are pursuing a response. The staff member remains employed by the United Nations. I'm afraid it wouldn't be appropriate for the Organization to comment further on an individual staff member's situation.

  Well, Inner City Press will comment further, as there is growing dissatisfaction with what Ban Ki-moon and his envoy Ibrahim Gambari, who took photographs at a wedding reception with ICC-indicted Omar al Bashir, are doing.

  Based on information provided by whistleblowers, it seems that the UN, DPKO and UNAMID have given up:

From: Aggrey KEDOGO/UNAMID/UNFIELDMISSIONS
To: Hawa Haydar/UNAMID/UNFIELDMISSIONS@UNFIELDMISSIONS
Cc: Imtiaz Hussain/UNAMID@UNAMID, Wolfgang Weiszegger/UNAMID@UNAMID, Tinkamanyire Mugisha/UNAMID/UNFIELDMISSIONS@UNFIELDMISSIONS, Fabrizio Hochschild/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Steve Damond-Fagot/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Armen Vahradyan/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Anthony Banbury/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Krzysztof Stasiewicz/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Joseph Lombardo/NY/UNO@UNHQ

Dear Hawa,

Concerning your inquiry of coming back to collect your personal effects, it will not be possible since there has not been any change in MOFA's decision. While I do understand that this may disappoint you, I would encourage you to explore the possibility of identifying a colleague in El-Fashar who could assist you with your personal effects.

   Supposedly there may be some interviews conducted in Entebbe - a UN facility which uses the mercenary firm Saracen. But from the above, it seems the UN and UNAMID have given up, while publicly claiming to still be fighting. This is the UN of Ban Ki-moon and his DPKO chief Herve "The Drone" Ladsous, advised on Peacekeeping by a Sri Lankan war criminal. Watch this site.

After S. Sudan Letter, UN Stalled on Chapter 7, Heglig & Sanctions, No SOFA

By Matthew Russell Lee

UNITED NATIONS, April 27 -- When the UN Security Council ended another Sudan session after 6 pm on Friday, at least three issues remained without agreement.

  These included how to refer to the damage to the oil facilities at Heglig, whether to have the resolution be under UN Charter Chapter 7 as the African Union had requested, and whether to delete or modify the reference to Article 41 in Operative Paragraph 9, as requested in a letter Sudan delivered to Council members Friday morning.

  Asked why there was resistance to using Chapter 7 as the AU communique requested, one Council member told Inner City Press, "this resolution is essentially about Chapter 6 mediation, and Chapter 8 regional organizations. Why put it under Chapter 7? So you can later invade?" 

  The last phrase seemed hyperbole. Some note that Sudan's letter did not object to Chapter 7, only to Article 41.

Inner City Press obtained Sudan's letter and put it online, here.

South Sudan also submitted a letter, and got it distributed by the US President of the Council, unlike Sudan, some noted. Inner City Press has just obtained the South Sudan letter and puts it online here.

  South Sudan's letter, from Representative Agnes Oswaha, among other things makes clear that the UN has STILL not signed a Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA for its Abyei mission, even after the lack of a SOFA played a role in the inability to med-evac out four Ethiopian peacekeepers hit and killed by landmines.
  
    DPKO's Herve Ladsous has repeatedly said the needed SOFA was immanent but, as with so much, it still has not happened.

From South Sudan's letter:

There are only a few areas where South Sudan believes the Resolution could be strengthened and made more precise.

We welcome Preambular Paragraph 11. It could be strengthened by adding reference to a "political and negotiated solution including all relevant Sudanese parties..." As has been recognized by many countries, while South Sudan can play a role in facilitating a negotiated peace in the Two Areas, it is still very important that Sudan sit with Sudanese parties to discuss their legitimate grievances, which predate even the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

2) We believe Operative Paragraph 1 (iv) could more precisely read "cease ANY [not "the'] harboring of, or support to, rebel groups against the Other State."

3) It would be more precise as well as helpful in advancing implementation of prior agreements if Operative Paragraphs l(vi) and 2(ii) of the resolution refer to the ful! name of the initialed nationality agreement -- the "Framework Agreement on the Status of Nationals of the Other State and Related Matters." This also would provide the opening to refer to -- and call for the implementation of-- the recently initialed border agreement in Operative Paraÿaph 2(iii). We respectfully propose that Operative Paragraph 2(iii) now read "resolution of the stares of the disputed and claimed border areas and the demarcation of the border, "including the demarcation of the already defined border areas, consistent with the Agreement between the Republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan on the Demarcation of the Boundary initialed in March 2012..."

4) South Sudan further welcomes Operative Paragraph 2 which calls for the resumption of "negotiations, under the auspices of the AUHIP and with the support of the Chairman of IGAD." (emphasis added). This is consistent with the call South Sudan has issued previously to immediately resume negotiations, reflect more on the current facilitation mechanism, and increase the high level international support given to the same. South Sudan welcomes the support and presence of IGAD in tile negotiations and would be pleased to see other provisions increasing the transparency of the negotiations and access to the negotiations for other States and institutions. That said, in light of this additional support to be provided by IGAD -- as was also called for by the AU in Paragraph 13 of the PSC's Communique -- and the role that the PSC has given to the Chair of the AU Commission with respect to these matters (including a monthly reporting role, as mentioned in paragraphs 18-20 of the Communique), South Sudan believes that the second part of Operative Paragraph 5 could read as follows: "requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the AUHIP, the Chair of IGAD and the Chairman of the AU Commission, to report within four months of the date of this resolution to the Security Council on the status of the negotiations, including detailed proposals on al! outstanding issues;". In this way the Security Council will be assured a report that draws upon many observations and perspectives.

5) Regarding Operative Paragraph 6, while South Sudan is most appreciative of the efforts of the AUHIP and has called for an immediate return to the negotiations, the terms of reference for the AUHIP technically provide that it is a facilitator and not a mediator mad as such, for accuracy, the wording should be "facilitation efforts" and not "mediation efforts".

6) With respect to Operative Paragraph 8, South Sudan would like to see the following addition: "expresses its intention to evaluate the mandate of UNISFA in the context of compliance by Sudan and South Sudan with the decisions set forth in tiffs resolution, and with the fulfillment of their commitments as set out in the June 20, June 29, and July 30, 2011 Agreements, as well as the adequacy of the number of its forces to carry out its mandated functions." South Sudan believes that this would expressly give the UN, in consultation with the relevant parties, an opportunity to clearly assess if the number of troops that were mandated to monitor the entire international border (a small number when compared with those present in Abyei) will be enough in light of the current circumstances, even with the good faith inplementation of this resolution and the prior security agreements reached between the parties. This is not to suggest that a new force be created, but only to suggest that the Council must examine in depth the question as to whether the existing UNISFA force has the resources to carry out its mandated duties.

7) In this context, we also respectfully suggest that the Security Council consider adding a paragraph with respect to the requirement of the two Governments to finally approve the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for the UNISFA forces, South Sudan has long been ready to sign such an agreement but there has been an unnecessary delay. Concluding the SOFA will facilitate the important work of UNISFA.

  But again, the UN has STILL not signed a Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA for its Abyei mission, even after the lack of a SOFA played a role in the inability to med-evac out four Ethiopian peacekeepers hit and killed by landmines. 

  DPKO's Herve "The Drone" Ladsous has repeatedly said the needed SOFA was immanent but, as with so much, it still has not happened. Watch this site.

As EU Proposes to Shoot 2 Km Into Somalia, No Comment on Halliday Finch

By Matthew Russell Le

UNITED NATIONS, April 27 -- When the European Union held a briefing Friday about its naval force off Somalia, by Operation ATALANTA commander Admiral Duncan Potts, it seemed the time to ask about reported EU plans to pursue pirates, at least by air, up to two kilometers inland.

  The German media Die Welt has reported:

"Last Wednesday, the [German] Federal Cabinet approved a mandate [that] states that 'German forces can go inland from the beach for a maximum of 2,000 meters to reach logistics sites set up by the pirates.' German helicopters can thus engage in air attacks against pirate boats, weapons or fuel storage installations up to 2 km in from the beaches."

  But when Inner City Press asked Potts about this proposal, he said Die Welt's reporting was "incorrect." He told Inner City Press, "I wouldn't focus too much on the two kilometers. We want to create the perception in the mind of the pirates that they can no longer act with impunity from beaches of Somalia. It's about the perception of impunity rather than a kinetic effect."

  But it still seems that the way the EU wants to "create this perception" is to shoot guns, from helicopters, up to two kilometers inside Somali territory.

  Afterward Somalia's Permanent Representative told Inner City Press that this is a problematic proposal, that their might be people hurt who are not pirates. He and his counterpart from Ethiopia came to the session, but both perceived it to be for journalists or other EU diplomats only. 

  To their credit they ultimately spoke up, and stayed afterward questions Potts, who answered by referring to a letter from Sheik Sharif to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. Will "General" Ban Ki-moon give his blessing to these helicopter strikes inside Somalia?

Already, Ban's UN is using the private military contractor Saracen for its Congo mission's operations in Uganda. (The Department of Peacekeeping Operations under Herve Ladsous, who had also proposed the UN's use of drones, had promised to provide a fuller answer about UN use of private security firms but then stopped responding.)

Back on March 30, Inner City Press asked Ban's deputy spokesman Eduardo Del Buey:

Inner City Press: On Somalia, there are reports saying that the Transitional Federal Government has contracted with a private security firm based in Nairobi called Halliday Finch to patrol its coast. I wanted to know, one, whether there is any UN involvement — whether Mr. [Augustine P.] Mahiga is aware of this, whether this constitutes the use of mercenaries...

Deputy Spokesperson Eduardo Del Buey: No, we’ll have to get information on that; I don’t have anything with me on that.

  The UN has yet to get or provide any information on this. But on April 5, Inner City Press received a reply of sorts from the spokesman for Halliday Finch:

Date: Thu, Apr 5, 2012 at 4:05 AM
To: Matthew Russell Lee [at] innercitypress.com
From: Stephen Harley, Director of Communications Halliday Finch

Dear Mr Lee, Allow me to introduce myself – my name is Stephen Harley and I am the Director of Communications for Halliday Finch, the East Africa-based security provider you referred to in your 03 APR 12 article, 'At UN on Somalia, Diplomat Admits Probe & Firing, Mercenaries Not Known' and in other entries.

 

We greatly appreciate your interest in our activities in support of the TFG's initiative to establish a national coast guard service. However, we are certainly not 'mercenaries,' nor do we employ any personnel who have ever been ‘mercenaries’. Halliday Finch is a provider of security services with extensive experience in Africa delivering training, static and mobile security (including escorting various senior politicians and celebrity humanitarians) and risk assessment. We are already a recognized UN vendor (and have provided services to the UN in Sudan and Somalia as a result).

As you are aware, only last week Halliday Finch, contracted by UN ODC, safely transferred 17 convicted pirates as part of regional judicial arrangements on piracy between the governments of the Seychelles and the Somaliland authorities.

Furthermore, the international community is fully aware of and in agreement with our support (primarily training and logistics) to TFG coastguard program. We can only assume that some UN staff in New York, with so many other issues to address, may not be aware of the program – key international players in East/Horn of Africa (UN POS, UN ODC, the EU, the various national embassies) certainly are.

We are still in the set-up period of the project and have yet to conduct any activities that would be relevant to the arms embargo. Rest assured, when we reach that phase of the project, all activities will be in complete concordance with the legislation and with the approval of the relevant international entities.

Should you require further information regarding our support to the TFG coastguard program or any of Halliday Finch’s other activities, please don’t hesitate to contact us.

We look forward to reading further articles on the subject of Somalia and East/Horn of Africa in the future,

Yours aye,

Stephen Harley
Halliday Finch International

  Given the reference not only to "celebrity humanitarians" but also to the EU, Inner City Press on April 27 asked the EU's Admiral Potts about the TFG's use of Halliday Fitch, as well as Saracen.

  Potts replied, "I'm going to be unhelpful. I am aware of, we take a keen interest in those other actors in the maritime space. It's not for me to comment on other nation's policies."

  No - just to fly two kilometers in, guns blazing. But to comment on the use of private military firms, and how this might implicate or need the approval of the UN's Somalia / Eritrea Sanctions Committee? No, then the EU, or at least Admiral Potts, will not "comment on other nation's policies." At least for now. Watch this site.